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 7 
Social animals need to coordinate with others to reap the benefits of group-living even when individuals’ 8 
interests are misaligned. We compare how chimpanzees, bonobos and children coordinate their actions 9 
with a conspecific in a Snowdrift game, which provides a model for understanding how organisms 10 
coordinate and make decisions under conflict. In study 1, we presented pairs of chimpanzees, bonobos 11 
and children with an unequal reward distribution. In the critical condition the preferred reward could only 12 
be obtained by waiting for the partner to act, with the risk that if no one acted, both would lose the 13 
rewards. Apes and children successfully coordinated to obtain the rewards. Children used a “both-14 
partner-pull” strategy and communicated during the task while some apes relied on an “only-one-partner-15 
pulls” strategy to solve the task although there were also signs of strategic behavior as they waited for 16 
their partner to pull when that strategy led to the preferred reward. In study 2, we presented pairs of 17 
chimpanzees and bonobos with the same setup as in study 1 with the addition of a non-social option that 18 
provided them with a secure reward. In this situation, apes had to actively decide between the unequal 19 
distribution or the alternative. In this setup, apes maximized their rewards by taking their partners’ 20 
potential actions into account. In conclusion, children and apes showed clear instances of strategic 21 
decision-making to maximize their own rewards while maintaining successful coordination. 22 
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Introduction 33 
Many animal species regularly face situations in which individuals need to coordinate to overcome 34 
conflicts of interest. Most research has focused on how groups decide on the direction of travel when 35 
individuals have differing preferences [1-2] but, as with humans, there are many other contexts involving 36 
a conflict of interest. For instance, lions [3] during inter-group encounters or chimpanzees [4] that lag 37 
behind in cooperative hunting events waiting for others to start the chase may avoid fighting, injuries and 38 
energy expenditure [5].  But if everyone waits, no hunt will ensue. Recent evidence suggests that some 39 
chimpanzees solve the coordination problem by starting the hunt and thus paying the initiation costs 40 
(acting as “impact-hunters”) [6]. However, it remains unclear whether the benefits that “impact-hunters” 41 
obtain from the hunt outweigh the initiation costs. In other words, it is unclear whether these subjects 42 
strategically take into account the potential costs and benefits of the hunt when they initiate it. 43 
Situations of the type described above can be understood as collective-action problems [7, 8], or at the 44 
dyadic level, as Snowdrift dilemmas (SD) [9-12]. The SD occurs when an individual (A) would prefer 45 
another individual (B) to carry out a costly action that benefits both A and B. However, if B does not act, 46 
it is better for A to act alone rather than not act at all.  Therefore the preference for A would be 1st) to 47 
wait for B to act, 2nd) divide the cost by acting together and 3rd) pay all the cost of the action. One crucial 48 
difference between the SD and other classical games such as the Prisoners Dilemma (PD) [13] is that the 49 
worst case scenario in the SD occurs when both partners defect while in the PD occurs when the individual 50 
cooperates but the partner defects.  Consistent with the idea that cooperation is less risky in a SD than in 51 
PD, both agent-based simulations [14] and human behavioural experiments [15, 16] have found higher 52 
and more stable levels of cooperation in SD than PD. 53 
In general, models in which mutual defection is the worst-case scenario offer a better explanatory model 54 
of the emergence of cooperation and helping in natural conditions [17]. Although models like the Stag 55 
Hunt game [18] –a situation in which each individual can decide between an individual option that 56 
provides a secure but less preferred reward or a social option in which participants need to collaborate to 57 
obtain a highly preferred reward– show crucial differences between the way chimpanzees and humans 58 
manage the challenge of coordinating actions and maintaining high levels of cooperation [19, 20], SD 59 
models seem a better fit for situations in which chimpanzees need to coordinate actions towards common 60 
goals [21-24], especially as soon as there is conflict of interest. Recently, two studies have investigated 61 
how chimpanzees [25] and five-year-old children [26] coordinate their actions in SD dilemmas. 62 
Chimpanzee dyads were presented with a task in which they could access food by pulling a weighted tray. 63 
Individuals could pull together and split the costs or they could pull alone and do all the work. However, 64 
if after a certain period of time neither individual had pulled, the experimenters removed the rewards. 65 
Chimpanzees solved the dilemma, cooperating on an average of 70% of trials. However, in situations 66 
where the tray was very heavy (and thus more difficult to pull) chimpanzees waited longer before pulling. 67 
Additionally, the difference between the weight pulled by the individual pulling first and pulling second 68 
increased across sessions. The authors concluded that the chimpanzees may have tried to avoid being the 69 
first one pulling to reduce the risk of pulling alone, while still maintaining successful coordination. In 70 
another study, Grueneisen and Tomasello [26] presented pairs of five-year-old children with a different 71 
version of a SD: two toy trains with rewards in the cargo. Each child controlled one train which had to 72 
arrive at its own station positioned behind the partners train to retrieve the rewards. However, if both 73 
trains continued along the track they were on, they would crash into each other before arriving to their 74 
stations and all rewards would be lost. Thus, one child needed to swerve onto a side track at the cost of 75 
some cargo. Therefore, it was in each child’s interest to wait for the partner to swerve. Children rarely 76 
crashed the trains by taking turns swerving. 77 
Although these two studies demonstrated that both species can solve SD dilemmas, they are not directly 78 
comparable because chimpanzee dyads had the option to cooperate and share costs within trials [25], 79 
whereas children did not [26]. Consequently, the current study presented children and two nonhuman 80 
great ape (henceforth ape) species, chimpanzees and bonobos, with the same SD dilemma paying special 81 
attention to any indication of strategic decision-making (i.e., waiting to pull). Although bonobos have not 82 
been studied in SD dilemmas, previous studies on cooperation indicate that they performed better than 83 
chimpanzees under some conditions that required higher tolerance towards conspecifics [27].  Study 1 84 
investigated subjects’ decisions in a SD and a competitive condition (COM). The best strategy in the SD 85 
condition was to wait for a partner to pull and thus obtain the higher of two rewards. However, as in the 86 
classical SD situation, it was better to pull if no-one pulled. We compared SD to COM, which required 87 
subjects to pull faster than the partner to obtain the higher reward. If subjects behaved strategically, we 88 
expected a higher latency to pull in the SD than COM and a higher frequency of both individuals pulling in 89 
COM than SD.  Finally, based on a recent study [20], we expected communication to play a role in 90 
children’s coordination but not in chimpanzees or bonobos.  We conducted a follow-up study with apes 91 
(Study 2) because some individuals in Study 1 had shown indications of strategic decision making by 92 
waiting to pull in the SD condition.  We used the same apparatus (and conditions) as in Study 1a except 93 
that we added an alternative option for each individual. We hypothesized that this would allow subjects 94 
to better manage the risk by choosing the alternative option depending on the options available in the 95 
apparatus and their partner’s preferences. 96 
 97 
Study 1a: Chimpanzees and Bonobos Snowdrift 98 
Subjects  99 
We tested 10 captive chimpanzees (5 females; Mage= 20.5 years) and 6 captive bonobos (5 females; 100 
Mage=13.7 years) housed at the Wolfgang Kohler Primate Research Center in Leipzig zoo (see Table 1 in 101 
the electronic supplementary materials, henceforth ESM, for more information about the apes in study 102 
1a and 2). During the first phase of the study, the chimpanzees made up 5 unique pairs and the bonobos 103 
made up 3 unique pairs. In the second phase pairs were reshuffled to create 5 new chimpanzee pairs and 104 
3 new bonobo pairs.  105 
Materials 106 
We presented ape dyads with a rotating blade (10x91 cm) (Figure 1a) attached to a platform (88.5x96.5 107 
cm) placed between two rooms. Each end of the rotating blade was baited by different amounts of fruit 108 
(banana slices for chimpanzees and half grapes for bonobos). Subjects faced each other across the 109 
platform, each with access to one side of the apparatus. Two identical ropes (76 cm) were attached to the 110 
interior end of the blade with Velcro (see Figure 1a) and fed into each subjects’ room. Subjects could 111 
access the apparatus via a small window on either side of the platform; the experimenter opened these 112 
windows at the start of a trial but the windows remained closed between trials. Apes could only access 113 
the interior or the exterior end of the blade by pulling the rope towards them or by waiting for the partner 114 
to pull from the other side, respectively. Thus, when a subject pulled its rope, the roped end of the blade 115 
rotated towards her while the free end rotated towards her partner.  116 
Figure 1. Experimental set-up of study 1a (Figure 1a), study 1b (Figure 1b) and study 2 (Figure 1c). 117 
Design and procedure 118 
We used a within-subjects design with two conditions (SD & COM). In the SD condition, one piece of fruit 119 
was placed on the roped end of the blade and four pieces on the free end, thus creating a SD dilemma 120 
because the subject’s best choice was to wait for the partner to pull and bring the free end within her 121 
reach. In the COM condition, the four pieces of fruit were placed on the roped end while the free end was 122 
baited with one piece. In this condition subjects should pull earlier than their partner to obtain the higher 123 
reward.  124 
At the start of a trial, two experimenters allowed subjects access to their respective ropes by opening the 125 
windows. The subjects then had 30 seconds to pull the rope and get the rewards placed on the rotating 126 
blade or wait for the partner to pull. If no ape pulled after the 30 seconds, the experimenter removed all 127 
rewards and ended the trial. In case both individuals pulled simultaneously, one or both ropes 128 
disconnected from the blade resulting in a random movement and a possible loss of all rewards. 129 
Training phases 130 
Prior to the test phase all subjects completed two training phases (see ESM for more details of the training 131 
phases).  132 
Phase 1. Individual training 133 
This training phase served to expose the subjects to the task’s main contingencies including how to access 134 
the rewards. Subjects were required to pull the blade to retrieve food. After pulling the rope subjects 135 
could access both rooms and retrieve the food from both sides of the apparatus. 136 
Phase 2. Dyadic training 137 
This training served to demonstrate that, depending on the condition, subjects could get either high or 138 
low rewards by either pulling themselves or by waiting for a partner to pull.  139 
Test sessions 140 
After completing the training phases each dyad received eight 8-trial test sessions (4 SD and 4 COM trials 141 
in a randomised order). Subjects only received one session per day and switched sides between sessions. 142 
Test sessions were identical to the dyadic training sessions except that both subjects had access to their 143 
own rope.  After completing eight sessions with their first partner (phase 1) each subject was paired with 144 
another one for another eight sessions (phase 2). 145 
Coding 146 
Our measure of coordination success was the percentage of trials in which dyads succeeded, defined as 147 
trials in which at least one member obtained a reward. We scored three further dependent variables: 148 
subjects’ latencies to pull, their pulling rate (derived in three different measures) and communication (see 149 
ESM for details of interobserver reliability measures for all studies). We defined the latency to pull as the 150 
elapsed time between the opening of the doors and the first pulling action).  We defined a pulling action 151 
as either the first instance of blade movement towards a subject or the first instance of tension between 152 
the ropes of both subjects, which occurred when both subjects pulled simultaneously.  Communication 153 
was defined as any vocal or gestural communicative acts directed towards the partner or the partner´s 154 
actions, such as attention-getters (see ESM for details). It is possible, though, that we may have missed 155 
more subtle cues of communication. 156 
We calculated three measures derived from the subject’s pulling rate. First, we considered whether apes 157 
behaved strategically by comparing the number of strategic choices (i.e., proportion of pulls in the COM 158 
condition plus the proportion of non-pull decisions in the SD condition) to the levels expected by chance. 159 
With this information we also classified subjects as pullers (pulling ≥ 75% of trials in both conditions), non-160 
pullers (pulls ≤ 25% of trials in both conditions) and strategisers (COM pulling > SD pulling resulting in a 161 
food intake significantly above chance in both conditions).  Second, we scored conflict trials defined as 162 
both subjects pulling simultaneously and investigated whether their likelihood of occurrence increased by 163 
the occurrence of a conflict in the previous trial. Finally, we investigated subjects’ flexibility defined as the 164 
change in pulling behaviour shown between subjects (see the ESM for details). 165 
Statistical analysis 166 
All analyses were conducted using linear mixed models (LMM) or generalized linear mixed models 167 
(GLMM). In all models significance was set at P < 0.05 (see ESM for full details of the statistical analysis). 168 
 169 
Results and discussion 170 
Overall, dyads obtained the rewards in 98% of trials. Subjects waited longer to pull during SD than COM 171 
trials (Model 1, LMM: 2
1
 = 9.181, N = 1019, P = 0.002, CI [0.057, 0.483]). From their pulling rates, we 172 
classified four subjects as “pullers”, three as “non-pullers” and two as “strategisers”. The remaining seven 173 
subjects were unclassified. The two “strategisers” (one male chimpanzee and one female bonobo) pulled 174 
in COM trials and not in SD trials (binomial test, p < 0.005), a behavior that resulted in a maximization of 175 
their payoffs (see Table 1 in ESM). However, when we considered strategies at the dyadic level a different 176 
picture emerged. In nine of 16 dyads one subject pulled in most of trials (>75%) while the other almost 177 
never pulled (<25%). Thus, a high proportion of dyads displayed a strategy based on only one subject 178 
pulling in both conditions. Pulling rates also indicated that apes were more likely to pull simultaneously in 179 
COM than SD trials (Model 2, GLMM: 2
1
 = 6.607, N = 895, P = 0.01). Previous conflict trials had no effect 180 
on their subsequent response (Model 2, GLMM: 2
1
 = 5.286, N = 895, P = 0.071) (see ESM for detailed 181 
information of Model 1 and 2). We found that subjects’ behavior changed between partners: 31% of 182 
subjects modified their behavior (varying their pulling rates by more than 50% between partners; see 183 
Figure 2 in ESM). Finally, we found that apes almost never communicated with their partner to solve the 184 
task (individuals protested on 0.01 % trials).  185 
In sum, chimpanzees and bonobos came up with an efficient, simple solution to coordinate in this task, 186 
the “only-one-partner-pulls” strategy. Although this strategy prevented subjects from maximizing their 187 
own payoffs, the randomized presentation of the rewards led to an almost equal division of rewards 188 
between partners. Moreover, two subjects behaved strategically although it was unclear why so few did 189 
so (2 out of 16 individuals) and what strategic level their decisions entailed. Next we presented 5-year-old 190 
children with the same basic task to compare their strategies to those of apes (study 1a) and subsequently 191 
probed ape strategic behavior further by varying potential payoffs for the subject and the partner in study 192 
2. 193 
 194 
Study 1b: Children Snowdrift 195 
Subjects  196 
We tested 20 pairs of- 5- to 5.5-year-old children (10 pairs of girls and 10 pairs of boys) in kindergartens 197 
in the Leipzig area. All participants were recruited from a database of children whose parents had provided 198 
written consent to take part in child development and comparative studies. The children in each pair were 199 
from the same kindergarten. 200 
Materials 201 
In general, dyads were presented with the same task as chimpanzees and bonobos (Figure 1b). The 202 
apparatus was a wooden box with a lid that prevented children from directly accessing the rewards. We 203 
made a few minor changes to accommodate the apparatus for children (see ESM for differences between 204 
study 1a and study 1b). 205 
Design and Procedure 206 
The procedure the same as the one used in study 1a except for three differences. First, children were only 207 
tested with one partner. Second, we used tokens (wooden blocks during training and more valuable 208 
plastic marbles (“jewels”) during test sessions) as rewards, which children had to collect during the study. 209 
Third, children received three sessions (24 trials in total) compared to 16 sessions (128 trials) for the apes 210 
(see ESM for other minor differences between study 1a and study 1b design and procedure). 211 
Test sessions 212 
After the training, each dyad performed three test sessions on two consecutive days.  The first session 213 
was conducted after the training and the second and third sessions were conducted on a second day. Each 214 
session consisted of eight trials and children swapped sides after completing trial four. Children received 215 
two COM and two SD trials in a randomised order from each side of the apparatus. At the beginning of 216 
each trial, Experimenter 1 showed the reward locations to the children before allowing them to access to 217 
the ropes. In the test sessions, children collected their rewards and kept them in their own plastic tubes 218 
previously provided by the experimenters (see ESM for details of the test sessions). 219 
Coding 220 
We analysed the same dependent measures as in study 1a, excluding flexibility because children only 221 
played with one partner. Additionally, we adjusted our coding to include verbal communication (see ESM 222 
for communication coding details).  We only analysed verbal communication related to the task by 223 
focussing on the five following types:  imperative: deontic verbs used to direct their partners’ actions (e.g. 224 
“You should pull”), protests: statements of disapproval and objection about a partner action’s or intention 225 
(e.g. “No, I also wanted”),  informative: acts aimed at informing partners about a child’s current or 226 
impending actions or intentions (e.g. “I am going to pull now”), turn-taking: stating previous or future 227 
actions aimed at influence others’ decisions. This type of communication could be coupled with either 228 
imperative, protests or informative (e.g. “I pull because you pulled before”; “Next time you pull”) and 229 
deception: acts aimed at explicitly cheating their partners.  230 
 231 
Results and discussion 232 
Overall, dyads obtained the rewards in almost all trials (99%). Children increased their latency to pull 233 
across sessions in SD trials and decreased it in COM trials (Model 3, LMM: 2
1
 = 4.913, N = 478, P = 0.027, 234 
CI [-0.023, 0.223]; Figure 2) indicating that like apes, they distinguished the conditions. Based on their 235 
pulling rates, we classified most children as “pullers” (24 of 40) and one child was classified as a “non-236 
puller”. Three children made strategic decisions significantly above chance (binomial test, p < 0.005) by 237 
pulling in COM trials and not pulling in SD trials (see ESM for a detailed comparison between children’ and 238 
apes’ strategies). At the dyadic level, only one dyad followed the “only-one-partner-pulls” strategy 239 
described for apes. Instead, most child dyads followed a “both-partners-pull” strategy regardless of the 240 
condition. In contrast to apes, children both pulled equally often in COM (53 % of times together) 241 
compared to SD trials (43 % of times together) (Model 4, GLMM: 2
4
   = 5.305, N = 420, P = 0.257). Finally, 242 
we found that children communicated more often in SD than COM trials (Model 5, GLMM: 2
1
   = 4.72, N = 243 
480 P = 0.03, CI [-0.219, 2.464]). Communication occurred in 33% of the trials (in 96 SD and 56 COM trials 244 
out of 240 trials per condition). Although we could not analyze statistically the distribution of children 245 
communicative types, we found that imperative utterances (e.g. “you should pull”) were mostly used in 246 
situations in which they needed a partner to act against the partners’ self-interest (58% of 96 247 
communicative acts in SD trials). In contrast, no communicative type predominated in competitive 248 
situations (see ESM for detailed information of Models 3, 4, 5 and Figure 4 in ESM). 249 
Figure 2. Latency of the 1st puller to pull the rope in SD and COM trials across the three test sessions. The 250 
dotted line represents the fitted model and the shadowed areas represent the CI at 95%. Latencies in 251 
seconds are presented in a logarithmic scale. Data from children in study 1b. 252 
In summary, children were as successful as apes and made a similar proportion of strategic choices 253 
compared to apes (53% of strategic choices in children, 51% in chimpanzees and 54% in bonobos). 254 
However, they did so with much less experience with the task -24 compared to 128 trials suggesting that, 255 
in contrast to apes, they learned faster the contingencies of the task. Unlike apes, we found that most 256 
children followed a “both-partners-pull” strategy regardless of the condition, which may not be that 257 
different in terms of complexity to the apes’ “only-one-partner-pulls” strategy.  However, children showed 258 
more signs of strategic decision-making than apes: they used communication to influence their partner 259 
decisions and learned to distinguish both conditions after only three sessions (Figure 2).  260 
 261 
Study 2: Chimpanzees and bonobos Snowdrift with alternative option 262 
In the previous study, although a majority of ape dyads engaged in the “only-one-partner-pulls” strategy, 263 
some apes showed indications of strategic decision making. To further investigate individuals´ decision-264 
making strategies in conflict situations, we used the same apparatus of Study 1a with the addition of an 265 
alternative option for each individual.  266 
Subjects 267 
We tested 8 captive chimpanzees (3 females; Mage= 13.5 years) and 4 captive bonobos (3 females; Mage= 268 
13.5 years) housed at the Wolfgang Kohler Primate Research Center in Leipzig zoo. Seven chimpanzees 269 
and all bonobos had taken part in study 1a. Each individual was tested with three partners. During the 270 
first phase of the study, the chimpanzees made up four unique pairs and the bonobos made up two unique 271 
pairs. In the second and third phase, pairs were shuffled to create another four new chimpanzee pairs and 272 
two new bonobos’ pairs per phase.  273 
Materials 274 
We presented pairs of individuals with the same apparatus used in study 1a with two main additions. In 275 
this new setup, subjects needed to move a sliding door either to the left or the right side to access the 276 
apparatus. If they moved the sliding door to the right side they could access the ropes as in the original 277 
apparatus. However, if they slid the door towards the left they could directly access an alternative option 278 
(Figure 1c). The alternative option consisted of a fixed platform (10X10 cm) attached to the Plexiglas frame 279 
located approximately 5 cm above the apparatus to not interfere with the rotation of the blade. When 280 
the sliding door was opened to one side, another locking mechanism prevented it from being moved back 281 
to its original position. Therefore, subjects could only make one choice per trial (see ESM for details of the 282 
materials). 283 
Design and procedure 284 
Subjects were tested in a within-subjects design in the same two conditions as study 1a (SD and COM). In 285 
this set-up the rotating blade was baited with one and five food pieces. The alternative platforms could 286 
be baited with either zero, one, three or five food pieces depending on the condition presented (non-287 
social condition levels). Both alternative platforms were baited with the same food quantity on a given 288 
trial.  Chimpanzees and bonobos received the same kind of food as in study 1a. 289 
At the beginning of a trial, two experimenters simultaneously removed the pin that had prevented 290 
choosing between options and apes had 10 seconds to make their choices. When a subject opened the 291 
window to the alternative platform, they could immediately access the reward. When a subject opened 292 
the door to the blade they could either wait for the partner to pull the rope or pull themselves (as in study 293 
1a). We defined an apes’ choice for the rotating blade as the “social option” and the alternative platform 294 
as the “non-social option”. 295 
Test sessions 296 
After completing the training phases (see ESM for details of the training phases), every dyad performed 297 
eight test sessions. Each session contained four SD and four COM trials presented in a randomized order. 298 
In the alternative platform, the levels of the non-social condition (0, 1, 3 or 5) were randomly presented 299 
between sessions, each level was presented in two sessions. In the test sessions, both subjects had access 300 
to either the rope attached to the rotating tray or the alternative option. Subjects switched sides between 301 
sessions. After the eight sessions with their first partner (phase 1) each subject was paired with two 302 
further partners for another two blocks of eight sessions (phase 2 and 3). 303 
Coding 304 
We measured the percentage of successful trials (defined as in study 1). Additionally, to study how 305 
chimpanzees and bonobos solved this new version of the game, we focused on two main dependent 306 
variables: choices and latencies (further divided in two latency measures). Choices were defined as the 307 
proportion of trials in which each subject chose the social or the non-social option. The first latency 308 
measure consisted of the elapsed time between the pins’ removal and the sliding of the door halfway to 309 
one side (at which point they could not change direction). The second latency measure was the elapsed 310 
time between accessing the social option and pulling the rope (defined as in study 1a). These latencies 311 
allowed us to assess whether the 2nd actors made strategic decisions contingent on the previous action of 312 
the 1st actors during the same trial. 313 
To determine who acted in 1st and 2nd position (by acting we mean the initial decisions to slide the door 314 
to access either the social or non-social option), we only considered those trials in which both individuals 315 
acted at different times (at least 
1
25
 of a second). The average time between 1st and 2nd actors was less 316 
than 2 seconds. Then, for each combination of social and non-social conditions (8 combinations) we 317 
categorized the strategic choices of the 2nd actors. Moreover, we took into account those instances where 318 
the 2nd actors could maximize their rewards by taking into account the previous action of 1st actors (see 319 
the two combinations of non-social option 3 in Table 1). In other words, in these two combinations 2nd 320 
actors strategic choices differed depending on 1st actors actions. Finally, we calculated the proportion of 321 
strategic choices for each of the 8 combinations and we compared them to chance levels. 322 
Table 1. Rational choices dependent on the combination of social and non-social options. 323 
Social option Non-social option Strategic choice 
SD and COM 0 Social option 
SD and COM 1 Social option 
SD 3 Same action of 1st actor 
COM 3 Opposite action to 1st actor 
SD and COM 5 Non-social option 
 324 
 325 
Results and discussion 326 
Overall, ape dyads obtained the rewards in 92% of trials. Both ape species behaved rationally by choosing 327 
the social option when there were no rewards available in the non-social alternative (93% of trials). As 328 
expected, the proportion of choices towards the non-social option relative to the social option also 329 
increased as the rewards in the alternative platform increased. This change was not driven solely by the 330 
number of rewards in the alternative option but also by the social condition: the switch in preference 331 
from the social to the non-social option was steeper in SD trials compared to COM trials (Model 6, GLMM: 332 
2
1
   = 9.572, P = 0.002, N = 2218, CI [0.284, 2.258], Figure 3). 333 
Figure 3. Percentage of chimpanzees and bonobos’ decisions towards the social choice as a function of 334 
the number of food pieces in the non-social and the social option (SD and COM trials) in study 2. 335 
Our first latency measure was the time taken to open the door to either platform. When there was no 336 
reward in the non-social platform apes waited longer to open the doors in SD trials compared to COM 337 
trials, replicating the findings from study 1a. However, as the rewards in the non-social platform increased, 338 
apes tended to decrease their latency to decide, and the differences between SD and COM conditions 339 
decreased. This decrease in latency occurred in conjunction with a change in their decisions, from the 340 
social to the non-social option (see Figure 3) (Model 7, LMM: 2
1
   = 6.62, N = 2216, P = 0.01, CI [-0.007, 341 
0.295], see Figures 6 and 7 in the ESM). Overall, chimpanzees were faster than bonobos in both conditions 342 
(Model 7, LMM: 2
1
   = 8.06, N = 2216, P = 0.004, CI [-1.061, -0.099]) but there were no significant 343 
interactions between species and conditions. 344 
Our second latency measure focused on whether subjects waited further for their partner to pull in the 345 
SD condition, or whether the decision to open the door always led to immediate pulling of the rope. We 346 
found that both chimpanzees and bonobos did indeed wait longer to pull in SD trials compared to COM 347 
trials. Additionally, as the rewards in the non-social option increased apes tended to wait longer to pull 348 
(Model 8, LMM: 2
1
   = 3.888, N = 773, P = 0.048, CI [-0.044, 0.37], see Figures 8 and 9 in the ESM), with a 349 
more pronounced effect in bonobos. This was unexpected as at that point the content of the non-social 350 
option was already inaccessible and thus should not play a role in their decision to wait.  However, these 351 
results should be interpreted cautiously as they are based on a small subset of trials (see Figure 3). 352 
Overall, we found that the individuals acting second made strategic decisions on 85% of the trials. 353 
Moreover, when they could respond to the decision that the first actor had made in that trial –in non-354 
social option 3, they made strategic choices on 75% of trials. However, they only chose significantly above 355 
chance when there were 0 or 5 food rewards baited in the alternative platform (P < 0.02; see Model 9 for 356 
detailed results of the pair-wise comparisons derived from the model and Figure 10 in ESM). Finally, we 357 
also found that 2nd actors differed in their choices depending on the previous choices of the 1st actors and 358 
the combination of social and non-social conditions presented (combinations Non-social option 1-SD, 359 
Non-social option 3-COM and Non-social option 5-COM) (Model 10, GLMM: 2
2
   = 12.53, N = 396, P = 360 
0.002). Moreover, a further inspection of the model revealed that the probability of 2nd actors to choose 361 
the social option increased when 1st actors chose the social option in Non-social option 1-SD (P = 0.02) but 362 
the choice was not significantly affected in the other two combinations (Non-social option 3-COM: P = 363 
0.22; Non-social option 5-COM: P = 0.4).  See ESM for detailed information of Model 6-10. 364 
 365 
In sum, results of study 2 substantially clarified those from study 1a by showing that when apes had access 366 
to an alternative option, their decisions were clearly strategic. They understood the payoffs of the game 367 
and acted rationally according to all the rewards involved by maximizing their benefits, as shown in 368 
previous social dilemmas [28]. This may have simply been due to increased experience, as all individuals 369 
completed study 1a before study 2. However, if this were the case, we would have expected changes 370 
across sessions in study 1a. We suggest that one important factor is that the inhibitory demands of study 371 
1a were higher. Subjects faced the decision to either act on the apparatus (pull) or not at all, but in study 372 
2 apes could decide between the two actions (sliding the door left or right). Thus, one possible way to 373 
interpret our results is that when apes had to actively decide between different alternatives, it may have 374 
been easier for them to inhibit and compare their potential options and act appropriately according to 375 
the payoffs of the game in order to maximize their rewards.  376 
 377 
General Discussion 378 
Using the Snowdrift dilemma to investigate how pairs of children, chimpanzees and bonobos coordinate 379 
their actions to overcome conflicts of interest, we found that all three species coordinated their actions 380 
effectively and succeeded in over 90% of the trials. All species showed clear indications of strategic 381 
decision making, trying to maximize their own rewards while maintaining high levels of coordination. In 382 
study 1, children’s communicative acts revealed clear signs of strategic behavior but no such indication 383 
was observed among apes. In study 2, in which apes had access to an alternative (non-social) option, their 384 
decisions were clearly strategic even though communication between partners was still virtually 385 
nonexistent.   386 
Children are skilled at coordinating for mutual gain from a young age [20, 26, 29-31]. Even in situations 387 
where the risk of coordination failure is increased, children are able to use communication and theory of 388 
mind reasoning to avoid this risk [20, 26, 29 and 32].  However, the goals of partners in those studies were 389 
aligned (i.e. there was no conflict of interest between partners).  The current study showed that even 390 
when facing with a potential conflict of interest, children’s rate of coordination failure was very low.  391 
Crucially, their success in the task cannot be attributed to a failure to appreciate the conflict of interest 392 
because their communicative exchanges indicated that they encouraged their partners to pay the higher 393 
cost to maximize their own rewards.   394 
Our results are consistent with Grueneisen and Tomasello. [26] who also observed high levels of 395 
coordination in five-year-old children playing a version of the SD game.  Coordination in that study was 396 
maintained by turn-taking, which also has been shown to enable resource sharing in a collaborative task 397 
[33]. Note however, that children in those studies always depended on their partner to obtain either the 398 
preferred reward [26] or all the rewards [33]. In contrast, our procedure eliminated a strict partner 399 
dependency because SD trials were randomly intermixed with COM trials in which children competed to 400 
obtain the preferred reward by pulling first, without the need of their partner’s action.  Besides preventing 401 
partner dependency, mixing SD and COM trials may have made a turn-taking strategy much more 402 
cognitively demanding than previous studies (and therefore useless) because it would have required 403 
children to keep track of all their previous actions and outcomes to maximize efficiency.  However, a 404 
consequence of this strategy is that the coordination was maintained despite a skewed reward 405 
distribution between partners (also observed in Grueneisen et al. [26]), perhaps because receiving some 406 
reward was more important than the social comparison, but further research is needed to determine the 407 
effects of resource inequality on coordination. 408 
Apes also solved the SD dilemma successfully (coordination in 98% of the trials) but their behavior differed 409 
from children’s in two important ways:  there was little communication between partners and only one 410 
partner pulled in most dyads.  This strategy produced an equal distribution of rewards between partners, 411 
which may seem surprising given that apes behaved as rational maximizers in other studies [28, 34].  412 
However, the observed equal distribution may have been a by-product of the one-partner-pulling strategy 413 
combined with the counterbalancing of payoffs across multiple trials. Even when one of the partners was 414 
a passive participant (always waiting) it does not necessarily mean that they were indifferent to the 415 
outcomes.  Apes experienced pulling in both conditions during the training and experimental sessions, 416 
and there is evidence suggesting that subordinate chimpanzees wait to pull a rope to “negotiate” a better 417 
reward distribution with a dominant individual [35]. Thus, it is conceivable that some apes preferred to 418 
obtain lower rewards instead of competing for higher rewards to avoid conflict [21]. However, in our case 419 
it is difficult to ascertain whether not pulling was a strategic decision, or some individuals were content 420 
with the food received for not pulling at all.  421 
Study 2 directly addressed this ambiguity by offering an alternative option to inaction.  Based on their 422 
change in preference from social to non-social choices (and their associated timing), apes generally 423 
behaved more strategically in study 2 compared to study 1. However, apes not always maximized their 424 
rewards in all conditions. For instance, when apes were confronted with the COM condition (five pieces 425 
of food in the roped end) and the alternative option was baited with three pieces of food, they sometimes 426 
preferred the lower but secure reward even when they pulled first (20% of times they chose the non-427 
social option).  Perhaps an aversion to either risk or even competition with their partners led them to 428 
select lower value (but secure) rewards in those cases. In the absence of risk, chimpanzees prefer to act 429 
alone rather than to collaborate provided both actions yield the same rewards [34] but they switch to 430 
collaborative options that result in better outcomes than acting alone [34, 36]). However, if social risks 431 
increase, as in the current study or other tasks [20], they may prefer lower but more secure rewards, thus 432 
managing a trade-off between competition and reward maximization. 433 
Based on previous findings [37, 38], we expected bonobos to be more risk averse (preferring the secure 434 
option) than chimpanzees but we found no clear inter-specific differences. A possible explanation for this 435 
result is that most studies have focused on non-social risk effects. Interestingly, in a study in which 436 
bonobos could choose between feeding alone or co-feeding with strangers, they preferred the social 437 
option [39] despite the potential social risks involved. Thus, we need further studies comparing 438 
chimpanzees and bonobos across different social and non-social risk tasks to fully understand possible 439 
differences between these two species. 440 
Finally, we investigated whether apes took advantage of situations in which they already had information 441 
about their partner’s decisions (i.e. when their partner acted before them) and whether they varied their 442 
choices depending on their partner´s previous choices. Overall, individuals acting second chose 443 
strategically. However, in those conditions where the strategic choice of second actors differed depending 444 
on what their partner had chosen in that trial, they did not perform significantly above chance. Moreover, 445 
in some combinations of social and non-social conditions, the decisions of individuals acting second were 446 
affected by their partners’ previous choice, suggesting that they were taking into account their partners 447 
previous actions. Our results are consistent with previous studies in competitive contexts showing that 448 
chimpanzees can adjust their strategies in anticipation of likely decisions of partners [40, 41] but we did 449 
not see clear strategic responses to a partner’s specific decision. The short time that apes had to respond 450 
to their partner and the random presentation of conditions within sessions may have contributed to this 451 
outcome. We found that apes anticipated their partner’s likely behaviour when they faced a symmetrical 452 
conflict of interest in which both participants started with the same probabilities to maximize their pay-453 
offs. However, to explore in more detail whether apes act strategically in response to their partners’ 454 
decisions, future research could focus on how apes solve conflicts of interest when only one individual 455 
has bargaining leverage (i.e. only one member of the pair has access to an alternative option). 456 
In conclusion, using a Snowdrift game to model situations such as group hunting or agonistic intergroup 457 
encounters in which individuals need to overcome a conflict of interest to coordinate with others, we 458 
found that pairs of children, chimpanzees and bonobos successfully solved this social dilemma. However, 459 
they did so in different ways.  Whereas both partners pulled and communicated in children, one of the 460 
partners did most of the pulling in apes with virtually no communication.  Nevertheless, an additional 461 
study that included an additional secure option revealed that apes behaved strategically by choosing 462 
options that maximized their own payoffs, which in some cases included delaying (or accelerating) their 463 
choices to net the largest reward available.  464 
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